Who is responsible for natural disasters

The previous section discussed some of the reasons for treating the distinction with care. The traditional distinction between natural evil and human evil is related to but is not equivalent to another traditional distinction between natural evil and moral evil. Human participation in causal processes that lead to natural disasters having negative outcomes does not necessarily mean that we deal with the human moral responsibility for the negative consequences of these processes.

For example, if a hurricane wind tosses me into someone who is thereby hurt, I am clearly a part of the causal chain leading to this suffering. Yet, typically I will not be held morally responsible for the suffering. In other situations we can justifiably be held or hold someone else responsible and culpable for the outcomes of a natural disaster. Yet, we never or almost never encounter paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility in the context of natural disasters.

That is, if by paradigmatic cases we mean planned actions that are based on the intention to cause the disaster or aggravate its consequences. Most perhaps all cases of moral responsibility for the outcomes of natural disasters are either cases of culpable negligence or cases of responsibility for the unintended or unforeseen side-effects of our actions or omissions.

In some cases the context provides us with salient normative expectations that can ground ascriptions of responsibility. Perhaps the simplest examples are situations in which an official did not perform her professional duties or did not perform those duties in a way that can be reasonably expected and thereby contributed to the negative outcomes of the disaster.

Perhaps someone failed to perform routine-checks of early warning systems and the systems did not sound the alarm when the disaster struck.

Or perhaps the officials responsible for evacuating the disaster zone failed to perform their task. In such situations we can base our ascriptions of moral responsibility on our ascriptions of culpable negligence, where the latter is defined in the context of professional duties or contractual obligations. This reasoning can be extended to contexts where other types of normative expectations are salient. Many of us, for example, are aware of the fact that carbon emissions lead to human-induced global warming which in turn can increase the likelihood and severity of some types of disasters.

We come to accept that such an increase in the likelihood and severity of disasters is a bad thing, and this results in a normative expectation on our part to lower our carbon footprint. Acting or failing to act in conflict with this normative expectation can then begin to be moralized. Here, the outcomes for which we are evaluated are likely to be side-effects of our other intentional behaviours, such as heating our homes or travelling to work.

The knowledge condition is very important for this type of moral responsibility ascription. At least in some societies there now is an expectation that one should be aware of basic claims about the human contribution to climate change. Failure to possess this knowledge is beginning to be treated as culpability e. Seibokaite, In a similar way, normative expectations can also arise from realizing that the current means of dealing with disasters sometimes favours privileged populations, creating additional disadvantages for already vulnerable populations.

One such widely discussed issue is the fact that the floodwalls in lower Mississippi tend to be built in a way that directs floodwater away from the more affluent areas Steinberg, The more we learn about the side-effects of human activities, the more likely we are to encounter situations in which we can be expected to take these side-effects into account when acting.

If the considerations provided in this paper have some merit, we can conclude that sometimes human beings can be morally responsible for the outcomes of natural disasters and such responsibility ascriptions will most often be grounded in culpable negligence, including the culpable failure to prevent the side-effects of our actions or omissions.

However, even if we come to accept that human beings can sometimes be morally responsible for the outcomes of natural disasters, in individual cases it can be very difficult to establish firm causal and conceptual links between human activities either actions or omissions and the outcomes of natural disasters.

First, as already mentioned, human activities often constitute only a part of the causal process leading to the outcomes. Second, relevant human activities are often collective actions in which the contribution of a particular individual is very small—individual action is extremely unlikely to tip the scales consider the contribution to global warming Banks, ; Gilbert, ; Sinnott-Armstrong, Third, where the probability of a natural disaster occurring is sufficiently low, post hoc arguments to the effect that particular human agents had positive obligations to take preventive steps in order to mitigate the outcomes of the disaster cannot be easily produced.

Fourth, the unpredictable and catastrophic nature of natural disasters makes it extremely difficult for an agent to foresee the potential outcomes of her activities. All these considerations suggest that it can be difficult to ascribe responsibility in individual cases. They do not show, however, that we can never be justified in doing this. Normative expectations presuppose that the agent is in a position to know or predict the consequences of her actions.

This information may often be unavailable to the agent. Nonetheless, science-backed information on disaster risks and disaster resilience is becoming more readily available including via influential reports by such international bodies as the IPCC or UNISDR and societal expectations that we should seek and act on this information are becoming more widespread. These expectations are currently even beginning to have large-scale societal effects. For example, partly in response to public pressure, university endowments, pension funds and various foundations have started shifting their capital out of greenhouse gas emission-intensive activities.

The more prognostic power we gain, the greater our technological abilities to prevent or alleviate disasters, or deal with the outcomes of disasters. The more we know about the effects of human activities on processes occurring on Earth, the more difficult it is to hide behind our ignorance. Annas, G. Worst case bioethics: Death, disaster, and public health. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Search in Google Scholar. Asscher, J. The moral distinction between killing and letting die in medical cases. Bioethics , 22 5 , Banks, M. Individual responsibility for climate change. The Southern Journal of Philosophy , 51 1 , Borenstein, S.

Experts gathered in Nepal a week ago to ready for earthquake. Dretske, F. Psychological vs. Behavior and Philosophy , 32, Gilbert, M. Collective moral responsibility and its implications for group members. Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 30 1 , Haldane, J. Identifying privative causes. Analysis , 71 4 , Most people who are displaced by natural disasters remain within the borders of their country. They are internally displaced persons IDPs as defined in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and thus entitled to the full range of rights and responsibilities included therein.

As with people displaced by conflict, it is their national governments who are responsible for protecting and assisting them and with facilitating durable solutions for their displacement. We know that poverty and marginalization makes things worse for victims of natural disasters. Natural disasters in poorer countries have higher casualties than disasters of similar magnitude in wealthier countries.

Within countries, it is often the marginalized groups who suffer disproportionately. In Colombia and the Philippines, for example, it is usually poorer, marginalized groups who live on the slopes of volcanoes. People with more resources choose to live elsewhere.

And so, when the volcanoes erupt, it is the poor who suffer disproportionately. In Central America and Brazil, it is the poor who live in shantytowns on the hills surrounding major cities — hills which are susceptible to mudslides at times of heavy rain.

We know that women are more likely to die in floods by a factor of 3 or 4 to 1 than men. Children, the elderly, the disabled and the sick are also more likely to suffer as a result of natural disasters.

In the aftermath of the tsunami, there was recognition that disaster response involves more than delivery of humanitarian assistance. Growing recognition of the need to respect, uphold, and promote the human rights of those affected by natural disasters, whether displaced or not, was the driving force between efforts by the RSG to develop Operational Guidelines for Human Rights and Natural Disaster.

These guidelines, which were formally adopted by the InterAgency Standing Committee in June , are presently being used to train disaster responders on ways of ensuring that human rights are protected in the midst of disaster. The problems that are often encountered by persons affected by the consequences of natural disasters include: unequal access to assistance; discrimination in aid provision; enforced relocation; sexual and gender-based violence; loss of documentation; recruitment of children into fighting forces; unsafe or involuntary return or resettlement; and issues of property restitution.

The Guidelines suggest a human rights approach to planning both the initial emergency and longer-term response. People do not lose their basic human rights as a result of a natural disaster or their displacement.

Rather all of those affected by natural disasters, including those who are displaced, are entitled to the protection of all relevant human rights guarantees. As residents, and usually citizens of the country in which they are living, they are entitled to the protections afforded to all residents and citizens even though they may have particular needs related to the disaster and thus require specific assistance and protection measures.

As with all situations of internal displacement, the primary duty and responsibility to provide such protection and assistance lies with the national authorities of the affected countries. Those affected by natural disasters have the right to request and receive such protection and assistance from their governments.

The Operational Guidelines stress that human rights encompass not only civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights. However, in the midst of a disaster, it is often difficult to simultaneously promote all rights for all of those affected. Thus for practical reasons, the Operational Guidelines divide human rights into four groups, namely:. The Operational Guidelines suggest that the first two groups of rights may be the most relevant during the emergency, life-saving phase.

Thus in the initial disaster response, it is usually more important to ensure adequate access to water than to provide replacement identity cards to those who have been displaced. However, the guidelines insist that only the full respect of all four groups of rights can ensure adequate protection of the human rights of those affected by natural disasters, including of those who are displaced.

When governments are unwilling or unable to fulfill these responsibilities, the international community needs to support and supplement the efforts of the government and local authorities. And these organizations as well — UN agencies, international and national non-governmental organizations, civil society, and IDP communities themselves — have a responsibility to ensure that their approaches and programs incorporate a human rights focus.

In fact, most often, rights are violated not because of conscious intention but because of the lack of awareness or planning based on a rights-based approach. Many of the most important protection challenges in disaster situations are long-standing protection and human rights concerns which are brought to light and further exacerbated by the emergency.

Disaster situations cause and worsen protection risks such as sexual and gender-based violence; family separation; child trafficking; unequal access to assistance; discrimination in aid provision; enforced relocation; loss of personal documentation; land disputes and issues related to land and property rights.

As in situations of complex emergencies, natural disasters often result in internal displacement of populations. The State has the main role and responsibility to protect and assist affected populations.