What is the difference between divine right and social contract

The method of the original position supports this second principle, referred to as the Difference Principle, because when we are behind the veil of ignorance, and therefore do not know what our situation in society will be once the veil of ignorance is lifted, we will only accept principles that will be to our advantage even if we end up in the least advantaged position in society. These two principles are related to each other by a specific order.

The first principle, distributing civil liberties as widely as possible consistent with equality, is prior to the second principle, which distributes social and economic goods. In other words, we cannot decide to forgo some of our civil liberties in favor of greater economic advantage. Rather, we must satisfy the demands of the first principle, before we move on to the second.

Having argued that any rational person inhabiting the original position and placing him or herself behind the veil of ignorance can discover the two principles of justice, Rawls has constructed what is perhaps the most abstract version of a social contract theory. It is highly abstract because rather than demonstrating that we would or even have signed to a contract to establish society, it instead shows us what we must be willing to accept as rational persons in order to be constrained by justice and therefore capable of living in a well ordered society.

The principles of justice are more fundamental than the social contract as it has traditionally been conceived. Rather, the principles of justice constrain that contract, and set out the limits of how we can construct society in the first place. In his book, Morals by Agreement , David Gauthier set out to renew Hobbesian moral and political philosophy.

In that book, he makes a strong argument that Hobbes was right: we can understand both politics and morality as founded upon an agreement between exclusively self-interested yet rational persons. Gauthier, however, believes that rationality alone convinces persons not only to agree to cooperate, but to stick to their agreements as well.

We should understand ourselves as individual Robinson Crusoes, each living on our own island, lucky or unlucky in terms of our talents and the natural provisions of our islands, but able to enter into negotiations and deals with one another to trade goods and services with one another. Entering into such agreements is to our own advantage, and so rationality convinces us to both make such agreements and stick to them as well.

Gauthier has an advantage over Hobbes when it comes to developing the argument that cooperation between purely self-interested agents is possible. He has access to rational choice theory and its sophisticated methodology for showing how such cooperation can arise. The police have solid evidence of a lesser crime that they committed, but need confessions in order to convict them on more serious charges. Each prisoner is told that if she cooperates with the police by informing on the other prisoner, then she will be rewarded by receiving a relatively light sentence of one year in prison, whereas her cohort will go to prison for ten years.

If they both remain silent, then there will be no such rewards, and they can each expect to receive moderate sentences of two years. And if they both cooperate with police by informing on each other, then the police will have enough to send each to prison for five years. The dilemma then is this: in order to serve her own interests as well as possible, each prisoner reasons that no matter what the other does she is better off cooperating with the police by confessing.

And if she does not confess, then I should confess, thereby being sentenced to one year instead of two. So, no matter what she does, I should confess.

However, had they each remained silent, thereby cooperating with each other rather than with the police, they would have spent only two years in prison.

We should, therefore, insofar as we are rational, develop within ourselves the dispositions to constrain ourselves when interacting with others. Both SMs and CMs are exclusively self-interested and rational, but they differ with regard to whether they take into account only strategies, or both the strategies and utilities, of whose with whom they interact. To take into account their utilities is to consider how they will fare as a result of your action and to allow that to affect your own actions.

Both SMs and CMs take into account the strategies of the other with whom they interact. But whereas SMs do not take into account the utilities of those with whom they interact, CMs do. And, whereas CMs are afforded the benefits of cooperation with others, SMs are denied such advantage. According to Gauthier, rationality is a force strong enough to give persons internal reasons to cooperate. The enforcement mechanism has been internalized. Given the longstanding and widespread influence that social contract theory has had, it comes as no surprise that it is also the objects of many critiques from a variety of philosophical perspectives.

Feminists and race-conscious philosophers, in particular, have made important arguments concerning the substance and viability of social contract theory. For the most part, feminism resists any simple or universal definition. Given the pervasive influence of contract theory on social, political, and moral philosophy, then, it is not surprising that feminists should have a great deal to say about whether contract theory is adequate or appropriate from the point of view of taking women seriously.

To survey all of the feminist responses to social contract theory would carry us well beyond the boundaries of the present article. Contract theory represents itself as being opposed to patriarchy and patriarchal right. It is not, however, a fundamental change in whether women are dominated by men. Modern patriarchy is characterized by a contractual relationship between men, and part of that contract involves power over women.

According to that story, a band of brothers, lorded over by a father who maintained exclusive sexual access to the women of the tribe, kill the father, and then establish a contract among themselves to be equal and to share the women. Patriarchal control of women is found in at least three paradigmatic contemporary contracts: the marriage contract, the prostitution contract, and the contract for surrogate motherhood.

According to the terms of the marriage contract, in most states in the U. All these examples demonstrate that contract is the means by which women are dominated and controlled. Contract is not the path to freedom and equality.

Rather, it is one means, perhaps the most fundamental means, by which patriarchy is upheld. The liberal individual is purported to be universal: raceless, sexless, classless, disembodied, and is taken to represent an abstract, generalized model of humanity writ large.

Many philosophers have argued, however, that when we look more closely at the characteristics of the liberal individual, what we find is not a representation of universal humanity, but a historically located, specific type of person.

Macpherson, for example, has argued that Hobbesian man is, in particular, a bourgeois man, with the characteristics we would expect of a person during the nascent capitalism that characterized early modern Europe. Feminists have also argued that the liberal individual is a particular, historical, and embodied person.

As have race-conscious philosophers, such as Charles Mills, to be discussed below. More specifically, they have argued that the person at the heart of liberal theory, and the social contract, is gendered. Christine Di Stefano, in her book Configurations of Masculinity , shows that a number of historically important modern philosophers can be understood to develop their theories from within the perspective of masculinity, as conceived of in the modern period. In particular, it fails to adequately represent children and those who provide them with the care they require, who have historically been women.

Theorizing from within the emerging tradition of care ethics, feminist philosophers such as Baier and Held argue that social contract theory fails as an adequate account of our moral or political obligations. Social contract theory, in general, only goes so far as to delineate our rights and obligations.

But this may not be enough to adequately reveal the full extent of what it means to be a moral person, and how fully to respond to others with whom one interacts through relations of dependence. Baier argues that Gauthier, who conceives of affective bonds between persons as non-essential and voluntary, therefore fails to represent the fullness of human psychology and motivations. She argues that this therefore leads to a crucial flaw in social contract theory.

Liberal moral theory is in fact parasitic upon the very relations between persons from which it seeks to liberate us. While Gauthier argues that we are freer the more that we can see affective relations as voluntary, we must nonetheless, in the first place, be in such relationships e.

Certain kinds of relationships of dependence, in other words, are necessary in the first place if we are to become the very kinds of persons who are capable of entering into contracts and agreements. She therefore suggests that we consider other models of human relationships when looking for insight into morality.

In particular, she offers up the paradigm of the mother-child relationship to at least supplement the model of individual self-interested agents negotiating with one another through contracts. Such a model is more likely to match up with many of the moral experiences of most people, especially women. Feminist critiques of the contractarian approaches to our collective moral and political lives continue to reverberate through social and political philosophy.

One such critique, that of Carole Pateman, has influenced philosophers writing outside of feminist traditions. As such, it also calls into question the supposed universality of the liberal individual who is the agent of contract theory. Some persons, in particular white men, are full persons according to the racial contract. As such they are accorded the right to enter into the social contract, and into particular legal contracts.

They are seen as fully human and therefore as deserving of equality and freedom. Their status as full persons accords them greater social power. In particular, it accords them the power to make contracts, to be the subjects of the contract, whereas other persons are denied such privilege and are relegated to the status of objects of contracts.

This racial contract is to some extent a meta-contract, which determines the bounds of personhood and parameters of inclusion and exclusion in all the other contracts that come after it. It manifests itself both formally and informally. So, race is not just a social construct, as others have argued, it is more especially a political construct, created to serve a particular political end, and the political purposes of a specific group.

The contract allows some persons to treat other persons, as well as the lands they inhabit, as resources to be exploited. This contract is not hypothetical, as Hobbes describes the one argued for in his Leviathan.

This is an actual contract, or series of contracts, made by real men of history. The racial contract makes possible and justifies some people, in virtue of their alleged superiority, exploiting the peoples, lands, and resources of other races. It is not the case that we have a political system that was perfectly conceived and unfortunately imperfectly applied. One of the reasons that we continue to think that the problem of race in the West is relatively superficial, that it does not go all the way down, is the hold that the idealized social contract has on our imagination.

We continue to believe, according to Mills, in the myths that social contract theory tells us — that everyone is equal, that all will be treated the same before the law, that the Founding Fathers were committed to equality and freedom for all persons, etc. An example of divine is the nature of Jesus. An example of divine is a person who always follows religious and moral codes of conduct.

However, it is not dispensational. The main negative aspect of this doctrine is that it gave the kings carte blanche to rule as they wished. This made it bad for the people who were ruled. Since they were appointed by God, kings did not they felt have to give any thought to what anyone on Earth wanted.

Yes, Catherine the Great, as well as all the Russian monarchs before and after her, believed in the divine right of kings. Another important element of force theory is colonization, which is a process in which people from another country or area come into a new area and set up a community.

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Also, Charles Louis The measures made to ensure the king does not have absolute power are not enough to prevent him from ultimately getting his way no matter what that may be. On page 27 Paine tells how the king made the declaration that there will be no law unless put in place by himself.

This effort to make the colonists powerless as to how they are governed is tyranny. Those who are in parliament so far away from the tragic events that take place in America who live in such a vastly different world are too ignorant to make judgements for America After Shays rebellion collapsed, the government realized that they need a new constitution and to strengthen the Articles of Confederation.

This was a long and hard decision on whether to give the people the right to voice their opinions or not. Mixed views on the subject were given so it was very difficult to come to a conclusion. The Magna Carta became known as one of the first documents to ever reduce the power of a king. Without boundaries, a ruler will abuse his power over the people.

So in order for a ruler to govern a nation correctly he must have laws and boundaries to follow. The Magna Carta was the first document to start a lawful monarchy in England. The need for this document was because King John had taxed, mis-governed and neglected the peoples rights until the barons, particularly Stephan hangton, forced him to sign the Magna Carta on June 15, Northern and Middle Colonies When the northern and middle colonies were founded, England had a strong hold over the colonies.

They controlled development and the government, among other things. But as the colonies developed, they began to have an ever-growing sense of independence that was a threat to its English rulers. As a result of this England went through much trouble in constantly trying to regain full control of the colonies. Early in the Development of Massachusetts and the other New England colonies, the government of England had paid little attention to the colonies due to civil strife back at home.

Locke thinks that man will give their property and trust into a king that they specifically pick.